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Abstract:	
In	this	paper,	we	explore	the	modernization	of	the	role	of	President	of	the	
International	Olympic	Committee	(IOC)	by	analyzing	the	actions	of	three	men	who	
held	the	position	during	the	20th	century:	Pierre	de	Coubertin,	Avery	Brundage,	and	
Juan	Antonio	Samaranch.	Employing	Weber’s	concept	of	charismatic	authority,	and	
considering	its	connections	to,	and	congruence	with,	contemporary	understandings	
of	political	celebrity,	we	examine	how	each	of	these	men	mobilized	their	influence	
and	authority	to	reinvigorate	the	political	energy	of	Olympic	sport	and	benevolent	
Olympism,	particularly	in	times	of	crisis	and/or	apathy.	In	turn,	we	illustrate	how	
the	IOC	under	Samaranch	came	to	embrace	celebrity	culture	and	spectacle	in	a	way	
that	solidified	the	organization’s	legitimacy,	power	and	influence	amidst	the	
challenges	of	governance	posed	by	late	modernity.	Our	central	argument	is	that	all	
three	of	these	men	were	charismatic	leaders,	in	the	Weberian	sense,	and	that	they	
mobilized	this	authority	using	the	forms,	means	and	opportunities	of	power	
particular	to	their	respective	time	periods.	In	turn,	the	extent	to	which	they	can	be	
considered	political	celebrities	should	be	considered	against	the	‘routinized	
authority’	that	has	become	ascribed	to	the	position	of	the	IOC	President	itself.			
Introduction:	
The	Olympic	Movement,	as	overseen	by	the	International	Olympic	
Committee	(IOC),	has	come	to	be	viewed	as	the	‘pre‐eminent	international	cultural	
movement	in	global	society’	(Roche,	2002,	165).	Its	influence	on	the	world	of	sport	
is	unquestionable,	as	is	its	international	profile	and	brand	recognition	(Wall,	2001).	
In	addition,	the	Olympic	Movement	and	IOC	are	notable	for	having	attained	broad	
levels	of	political	significance,	authority	and	clout	that	are	unprecedented	and	
unmatched	within	global	sport.	For	example,	in	2009,	the	IOC,	under	current	
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President	Jacques	Rogge,	was	awarded	permanent	observer	status	by	the	United	
Nations	(UN)	affording	it	the	opportunity	to	take	the	floor	at	the	UN’s	General	
Assembly	and	participate	in	consultations.	With	this	in	mind,	it	is	reasonable	to	view	
Rogge	as	something	of	a	‘political	celebrity,’	meaning	a	political	actor	who	engages	
with	and	trades	upon	popular	culture	in	order	to	achieve	pre‐determined	political	
goals	(Marsh	et	al,	2010,	drawing	on	Street,	2004).				
	
In	this	paper,	we	explore	the	historical	timeline	that	has	led	to	this	outsized	
political	power	currently	enjoyed	by	Rogge	and	the	Olympic	Movement.	To	do	so,	
we	focus	on	the	efforts	and	actions	of	three	of	the	IOC’s	previous	and	iconic	
presidents:	Pierre	de	Coubertin,	Avery	Brundage,	and	Juan	Antonio	Samaranch.	
Framed	by	Weber’s	notion	of	charismatic	authority	and	debates	regarding	its	
applicability	to	politics	and	celebrity,	we	illustrate	how	each	of	these	men	drew	on	
the	specific	privilege	and	opportunities	of	their	time	period	in	order	to	(re)position	
and	(re)invigorate	the	Olympic	Movement	as	a	legitimate	political	entity.	Indeed,	
under	Samaranch,	the	Olympic	Movement	eventually	came	to	embrace	fully	the	
emerging	media‐driven	celebrity	culture	of	the	late	20th	century.	An	effect	of	this	has	
been	the	celebritization	of	the	position	of	the	IOC	president,	through	many	of	these	
same	media	processes,	such	that	it	can	now	be	viewed	as	imbued	with	‘routinized	
charisma’	that	further	cements	the	organization’s	political	status	and	authority.	
We	argue	that	understanding	this	political	trajectory	must	account	for	the	
particular	charismatic	authority	of	each	of	these	three	former	presidents,	rather	
than	a	presumption	of	their	strict	celebrity	status,	particularly	given	the	specificities	
of	their	actions	and	the	time	periods	in	which	they	lived.	In	this	way,	we	concur	with	
the	claim	that	‘celebrity	is	a	new	form	of	objectivized	charisma,	but	does	not	replace	
it’	(Hughes‐Freeland,	2007,	p.	193).	In	our	view,	the	groundwork	for	the	political	
authority	and	celebrity	of	Rogge	was	laid	by	these	previous	IOC	presidents	through	
their	charismatic	abilities	and	rather	tireless	efforts	to	secure	the	international	
political	legitimacy	of	Olympic	sport.		
The	remainder	of	the	paper	is	organized	into	three	parts.	The	next	section	
offers	a	theoretical	overview	of	Weberian	charismatic	authority	and	its	implications	
for	the	relationship	between	politics	and	celebrity.	This	is	followed	by	a	critical	
analysis	of	Coubertin,	Brundage	and	Samaranch	and	their	actions	as	IOC	presidents.	
We	conclude	with	a	discussion	of	the	implications	of	considering	these	men,	and	
other	IOC	presidents	and	international	sporting	figures,	as	political	actors	produced	
by,	reliant	upon,	and	ultimately	inseparable	from	the	celebritization	of	Olympic	
sport.		
Theoretical	framework:	
The	relationship	between	celebrity	culture	and	politics	is	complex.	Much	has	
been	written	in	recent	years	of	the	twin	phenomena	of	celebrities	who	become	
political	actors	and	politicians	who	go	on	to	achieve	celebrity	status	(e.g.	Marsh	et	al,	
2010;	Kellner,	2010,	2009;	Hughes‐Freeland,	2007;	Drake	and	Higgins,	2006;	Street,	
2004;	West	and	Orman,	2002;	Marks	and	Fisher,	2002).	Most	analysts	acknowledge	
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the	increasing	overlap	between	celebrity	and	politics,	given	the	substantial	entrée	
into	the	political	sphere	of	various	celebrities	from	sport	and	entertainment	(i.e.	
celebrity	politicians)	as	well	as	the	celebrity	status	that	some	politicians	have	come	
to	achieve	(i.e.	political	celebrities)	(see	Drake	and	Higgins,	2006).	This	latter	
category	is	best	exemplified	by	Barack	Obama	who	attained	a	level	of	
‘supercelebrity’	underpinned	by	media	spectacle	in	his	successful	run	for	US	
President	(Kellner,	2009,	2010).	Indeed,	Obama	is	illustrative	of	the	extent	to	which	
contemporary	‘celebrity	is	dependent	on	both	constant	media	proliferation	and	the	
implosion	between	entertainment,	news	and	politics’	(Kellner,	2009,	716).	
Yet,	while	the	intensity,	breadth	and	depth	of	current	media	spectacle	makes	
possible	political	celebrities	like	Obama,	the	relationship	between	celebrity	and	
politics	is	not	entirely	recent.	Drake	and	Higgins	(2006,	p.	87)	state	that	‘the	
influence	of	celebrity	upon	the	political	process…	has	been	a	concern	for	much	of	the	
twentieth	century.’	Indeed,	politicians	have	made	themselves	into	staged	celebrities	
since	US	President	Andrew	Jackson	in	the	early	1800s	(Rojek,	2001).	Of	central	
import,	then,	is	less	the	contemporary	novelty	of	this	phenomenon,	and	more	the	
ways	in	which	celebrity	and	politics	have	become	blurred	and	the	implications	for	
governance	and	democracy	of	this	process	(Marsh	et	al,	2010).	
	Our	argument	is	that	Coubertin,	Brundage	and	Samaranch	all	worked	to	
assert	themselves	as	legitimate	political	actors	through	their	charismatic	authority	
and	in	doing	so	embraced	a	form	of	recognition	and	importance	akin	to	that	of	a	
political	celebrity.	Turner	(2004)	defines	a	celebrity	as	a	public	figure	who,	through	
various	media	representations,	becomes	known	for	exploits	beyond	the	strict	
confines	of	his/her	role	as	athlete,	singer,	politician,	etc.	Coubertin,	Brundage	and	
Samaranch	all	fit	this	basic	definition	to	the	extent	that	they	came	to	enjoy,	and	were	
even	seen	to	be	entitled	to,	greater	political	agency	on	an	international	scale	than	
would	be	expected	(or	even	accepted)	on	first	analysis	of	the	leader	of	a	sports	
organization	like	the	IOC.	As	we	describe	below,	they	did	so	by	effectively	promoting	
and	marketing	themselves,	a	key	feature	of	the	political	celebrity	phenomenon	
(Street,	2003).			
Clearly,	media,	commerce,	spectacle	and	celebrity	are	relevant	to	this	
process,	particularly	for	the	IOC	under	Samaranch	in	the	late	20th	century	when	the	
Olympics	became	increasingly	commodified	and	media‐driven.	However,	
considering	that	Coubertin	revived	the	modern	Olympics	decades	before	the	era	of	
significant	mass	media,	and	that	Brundage	generally	eschewed	the	vapidity	of	
spectacle,	a	further	theoretical	model	is	required	to	make	sense	of	their	activities.	
Here,	we	take	up	the	notion	of	charisma	as	developed	by	classic	social	theorist	Max	
Weber	(1966,	1978).		
Weber	identified	three	types	of	political	authority:	rational/legal,	traditional	
and	charismatic.	He	described	charisma	as:		
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“a	certain	quality	of	an	individual	personality	by	virtue	of	which	he	is	set	apart	
from	ordinary	men	and	treated	as	endowed	with	supernatural,	superhuman	or	
at	least	specifically	exceptional	powers	or	qualities.”	
These	special	qualities	of	charismatic	authority	are	not	inherent	or	apolitical	but	
proceed	from	social	stratification	that	Weber	articulated	along	the	lines	of	status,	
class	and	party.	Party	for	Weber	referred	to	the	various	means	of	political	access	
afforded	through	the	organization	of	power,	and	class	to	ownership	and	material	
advantages.	Both	can	be	seen	to	underpin	the	political	agency	of	Coubertin,	
Brundage	and	Samaranch	to	varying	degrees.	In	addition,	status	features	
prominently	when	discussing	authority,	particularly	in	relation	to	politics.	
According	to	Milner	(2010,	381),	Weberian	“status	is	the	accumulated	approvals	
and	disapprovals	that	people	express	toward	an	individual,	collectivity	or	an	object”	
and	is	often	manifest	as	a	status	group	(an	ideal	type)	within	a	status	system	of	
broader	social	relations.		
This	Weberian	theorizing	illuminates	the	sources	of	authority	and	privilege	
that	afforded	IOC	presidents	some	measure	of	political	import.	It	also	suggests	a	
theoretical	link	to	celebrity.	In	Ferris’	(2007,	p.	372)	words,	“celebrity	is	the	site	of	a	
surplus	of	contemporary	society’s	charisma	–	by	its	very	nature	it	involves	
individuals	with	special	qualities.”	This	perspective	supports	our	argument,	
discussed	further	below,	that	the	contemporary	political	celebrity	of	the	position	of	
IOC	President	stems	in	large	measure	from	the	routinization	of	the	charismatic	
authority	put	in	place	by	previous	presidents,	starting	with	Coubertin.			
Still,	a	direct	application	of	Weber’s	charismatic	leader	to	celebrity	has	often	
been	viewed	as	limited,	and	has	therefore	sometimes	been	dismissed,	given	that	
modern	societies	are	deemed	too	specialized	to	allow	stars	the	kind	of	
institutionalized	power	that	the	concept	demands	(O’Guinn,	1991).	Similarly,	
Kurzman	et	al	(2007),	suggest	that	contemporary	celebrity	contradicts	Weber’s	
analysis	of	status	because	Weber	projected	a	downward	trajectory	of	status	groups	
and	the	slow	‘inbreeding’	of	genealogical	status	over	subsequent	generations.	
Indeed,	if	Weber	is	read	in	a	strictly	evolutionary	or	deterministic	manner,	then	the	
specific	relevance	of	charisma	to	political	celebrity	becomes	increasingly	tenuous	
and	fades	over	time	as	social	relations	become	more	diffuse	and	multifaceted.	
It	is	important	to	appreciate,	then,	the	ambivalence	in	Weber’s	own	
theorizing	between	political	processes	of	bureaucratization	versus	those	of	
discipline	more	akin	to	the	work	of	Michel	Foucault.	Specifically,	genuine	
charismatic	authority	as	a	foundation	of	political	leadership	calls	for	complementary	
understanding	of	how	it	constructs	the	duty	of	followers	to	recognize	it	(Hughes‐
Freeland,	2007).	This	relationship	can	be	understood	specifically	through	Weber’s	
notion	of	‘routinized	charisma,’	by	which	charismatic	authority	is	transferred	from	
personal	qualities	into	roles	that	are	recognized,	and	ultimately	supported	and	
maintained	by	political	followers	(Marshall,	1997,	cited	in	Hughes‐Freeland,	2007).	
As	such,	political	celebrity	is	best	understood	as	a	new	form	of	this	routinized	or	
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objectified	charisma,	but	not	necessarily	its	replacement	(Hughes‐Freeland,	2007)	
as	suggested	by	some	theories	of	contemporary	celebrity	(see	Rojek,	2001).	
The	implications	of	this	relationship	are	significant	and	call	for	
understanding	of	the	context	in	which	charismatic	actors	enjoy	political	influence	
and	agency	and	the	role	that	these	actors	fulfill	within	the	broader	political	sphere.	
Marks	and	Fisher	(2002)	suggest	that	it	is	now	possible	to	identify	a	language	of	
political	celebrity	power	that	deploys	celebrities	in	the	service	of	constructing	
political	consent	that	is	effectively	simulated.	This	consent	is	required	to	maintain	
and	reinforce	the	current	political	order	in	the	face	of	sustained	public	apathy	
towards	participatory	democracy.	To	construct	their	framework,	Marks	and	Fisher	
connect	Weber’s	notion	of	charismatic	power	as	situated	in	the	compelling	or	
monarchic	leader,	to	theories	put	forth	by	Foucault	in	which	power	is	diffused	
throughout	the	body	politic	(also	see	Keyes,	2002,	cited	in	Hughes‐Freeland,	2007).	
In	turn,	they	embrace	the	work	of	Jean	Baudrillard,	for	whom	true	political	
engagement	in	contemporary	media‐saturated	societies	is	next	to	impossible	and	
apathy	not	only	reigns,	but	is	even	to	be	embraced	or	celebrated.	From	Baudrillard’s	
perspective,	in	such	a	mediated	culture,	the	premier	threat	to	political	elites	–	and	
thus	its	political	utility	to	the	masses	–	is	withdrawal	from	the	political	process	
altogether.	In	response,	the	cultural/political	role	of	the	political	celebrity	has	
become	to	energize	the	masses	through	the	use	of	Weberian	charisma	in	order	that	
they	might	be	encouraged	to	participate	through	(manufactured)	political	consent	
and	the	subversion	of	apathy.	Thus,	for	Marks	and	Fisher	the	political	authority	of	
charismatic	leaders	(and	celebrities)	stems	from	their	ability	through	privilege	and	
personality	to	imbue	themselves	as	legitimate	political	leaders	and	ideologues.	
Particularly	in	late	modernity,	characterized	by	reflexive	citizens	who	need	to	be	
persuaded	about	the	effectiveness	of	governance	and	encouraged	to	participate	
politically,	it	can	be	useful	for	political	actors	to	trade	on	celebrity	by	manipulating	
media	and	spectacle	(Marsh	et	al,	2010).			
Importantly,	this	relationship	between	authority	and	politics	is	often	
tautological:	authority	validates	the	ability	of	the	political	celebrity	to	reinvigorate	
the	political	order,	and	yet	authority	proceeds	from	the	ability	to	transcend	the	
limitations	or	‘noise’	of	participatory	democracy	(Marks	and	Fisher,	2002).	As	Marks	
and	Fisher	(2002,	392)	contend,	for	political	celebrities:	“It	seems	that	the	aura	of	
importance	they	have	created	for	themselves	provides	whatever	legitimacy	is	
necessary	to	act	in	a	political	capacity.”	
In	sum,	we	argue	that	the	kind	of	theoretical	framework	put	forth	by	Marks	
and	Fisher	holds	purchase	for	the	study	of	Coubertin,	Brundage	and	Samaranch	as	it	
encourages	analysis	of	the	strategies	through,	and	methods	by	which,	these	men	
transcended	the	‘messiness’	of	democracy,	and	the	various	threats	to	the	sanctity	
and	global	leadership	of	Olympism,	in	order	to	position	the	IOC	as	a	force	for	
positive	change	on	a	global	scale	(see	Peacock,	2011).	As	we	will	demonstrate,	the	
IOC	and	Olympic	Movement	experienced	a	series	of	peaks	and	valleys	with	regards	
to	its	legitimacy	and	importance	throughout	the	20th	century.	In	the	face	of	these	
	 6
challenges,	the	charismatic	authority	of	Coubertin,	Brundage	and	Samaranch,	
supported	by	the	emergent	commodification	and	spectacularization	of	the	Olympics	
and	western	culture	more	broadly,	proved	invaluable	for	reinvigorating	and	
reestablishing	the	Olympics’	political	authority.	In	turn,	we	argue	that	the	power	
ascribed	to	the	IOC	president	can	be	understood	as	an	effect	of	this	charisma	in	its	
routinized	form.		
Analysis:	
The	outsized	influence,	power,	and	autonomy	enjoyed	by	the	IOC	in	world	
society	have	made	the	organization	the	subject	of	significant	academic	and	popular	
interest	(e.g.	MacAloon,	1981;	Barney,	Wenn,	and	Martyn,	2002).	In	this	section,	we	
focus	on	the	means	by	which	the	IOC,	under	the	stewardship	and	charismatic	
authority	of	Coubertin,	Brundage	and	Samaranch,	maintained	this	power	(albeit	
unevenly).	Particular	attention	is	paid	to	the	recent	cooptation	and	instrumental	use	
of	celebrity	culture	over	the	past	three	decades	to	simulate	global	consent	and	
participation	within	the	ritualism	of	the	Olympic	Games.		
Coubertin	
As	with	most	influential	movements,	whether	political,	religious,	or	social,	
the	modern	Olympic	movement	and	the	restoration	of	the	quadrennial	Olympic	
Games	was	due,	in	large	part,	to	the	charismatic	authority	of	an	individual:	the	
Baron	Pierre	de	Coubertin.	Previous	attempts	to	stage	modern	re‐creations	of	the	
Olympic	Games	had	occurred	(most	notably	in	Greece	and	England)	with	varying	
degrees	of	interest	in	the	permanence	and	accuracy	of	the	reproduction	of	the	
ancient	festivals	(Young,	1996).	However,	Coubertin’s	vision	of	an	Olympic	
restoration	(beginning	at	the	very	end	of	the	19th	century)	has	proved	the	most	
successful	and	enduring.	Acceptance	of	the	reinstatement	of	these	quadrennial	
international	competitions	with	a	rotating	sequence	of	host	cities	was	neither	
immediate	nor	inevitable.	Without	Coubertin’s	tireless	and	impoverishing	
proselytizing	on	behalf	of	his	self‐proclaimed	movement,	the	Games	and	indeed	the	
contemporary	global	sport	hierarchy	would	not	have	developed	as	they	have	(see,	
for	example,	MacAloon,	1981;	Guttmann,	2002;	Young,	1996).	
From	the	beginning,	Coubertin	faced	stiff	resistance	to	his	Olympic	revival.		
The	first	several	editions	of	the	modern	Games	were	disappointing	to	Coubertin,	in	
1900	and	1904	in	particular,	largely	because	of	what	he	perceived	to	be	the	political	
usurpation	of	his	Olympic	ideals.	The	“problems	with	the	French	government	[in	
hosting	the	1900	Paris	Games],	coming	after	the	rude	treatment	he	had	received	in	
Athens	[at	the	1896	Games]”	convinced	him	“that	any	kind	of	state	involvement	in	
sports	introduced	‘a	fatal	germ	of	impotence	and	mediocrity’”	(Guttmann	2002,	22).	
And	it	was	not	the	political	‘interference’	in	the	hosting	of	the	Games	alone	that	
Coubertin	had	to	address.	The	very	act	of	defining	which	polities	were	allowed	to	
form	duly‐recognized	National	Olympic	Committees	was	itself	intensely	political	
and	controversial.	In	1911,	Coubertin	publicly	defended	the	IOC’s	practice	of	
recognizing	“sporting	geographies”	rather	than	political	ones	which	meant,	in	
	 7
essence,	that	the	IOC	reserved	the	right	to	recognize	an	independent	team	
composed	of	Finns	or	Czechs	(who	ostensibly	had	distinct	national	cultures)	rather	
than	requiring	them	to	compete	under	the	imperial	National	Olympic	Committees	
representing	Russia	or	Austria	respectively.	Naturally,	this	outraged	the	royal	
families	and	governments	(not	to	mention	the	Irish	and	others	who	did	not	enjoy	
Olympic	recognition	of	their	independent	‘nationhood’;	see	Peacock	2009).	
Coubertin	thus	faced	perpetual	political	pressure	from	Games’	hosts,	National	
Olympic	Committees,	and	individual	IOC	members	(who	often	did	not	take	to	heart	
the	injunction	that	they	were	to	be	missionaries	of	Olympism	within	their	nations	
rather	than	representatives	of	national	interest	within	the	IOC).		
Crucially	however,	Coubertin’s	efforts	to	reinstate	the	Olympic	Games	and	
lead	the	movement	that	fostered	them	were	in	order	to	demonstrate	the	
effectiveness	of	a	specific	set	of	ideological	propositions,	namely	“that	Olympic	
Games	model	democratic	social	arrangements;	that	athletic	competition	between	
nations	contributes	to	peace;	that	what	he	would	soon	call	‘true	internationalism,’	
that	is,	respect	for	and	celebration	of	national,	cultural	differences,	rather	than	
‘cosmopolitanism,’	the	extirpation	of	such	differences,	was	to	be	served	by	the	
Olympics;	and	that	ignorance	is	the	chief	enemy	of	peace	and	brotherhood	and	the	
Games	serve	an	educational	function…”(MacAloon	1981,	p.	189).	The	broad	idea	
that	sporting	exchange	among	nations	could	facilitate	enlightened	pacifism	was	
premised	on	the	fundamental	belief	that	nations	and	national	cultures	were	the	
appropriate	units	at	which	to	facilitate	such	exchange.	Thus,	Coubertin’s	aspirations	
for	the	IOC	were	inextricable	from	the	political	realm	because	they	relied	upon	the	
contours	of	the	political	world	(e.g.	state	borders).	Inevitably,	this	led	to	political	
conflict.		
Despite	his	insistence	that	the	International	Olympic	Committee	was	to	
transcend	such	petty	national	politics,	this	explicitly	political	course	Coubertin	had	
appointed	for	the	institution	effectively	prohibited	such	transcendence.	
Governments	could	not	resist	attempting	to	use	what	was	obviously	a	set	of	political	
practices	and	occasions	to	their	advantage.	An	Olympic	ideology	prohibiting	the	
‘mixture	of	sport	and	politics’	was,	in	Coubertin’s	own	time,	fundamental	to	the	
movement	but	Coubertin	had	indeed	permanently	fused	the	worlds	of	Olympic	
sport	and	international	politics	and	consequently	struggled	to	limit	partisan	
interests	being	contested	within	and	external	to	the	movement.1		
What	made	his	task	of	resisting	partisan	influence	over	the	Olympic	
movement	even	more	difficult	was	Coubertin’s	conscious	recruitment	of	(often	
former)	political	leaders	and	exploitation	of	aristocratic	networks	to	spread	the	
gospel	of	Olympism.	Though	his	charismatic	vigor	in	establishing	and	carrying	on	
the	Games	was	not	realized	through	the	holding	of	public	office,	(i.e.	Weber’s	“party”	
categorization),	Coubertin’s	energies	were	quite	consistently	directed	towards	the	
																																																								
1 These	political	contradictions	have	endured	to	the	present	day	where	the	contemporary	Olympic	
Charter	maintains	that	“The	goal	of	Olympism	is	to	place	sport	at	the	service	of	the	harmonious	
development	of	man,	with	a	view	to	promoting	a	peaceful	society”	(Olympic	Charter	2007,	11). 
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aristocratic	classes	throughout	Europe.	Similarly,	despite	his	aristocratic	birth,	
Coubertin’s	appeals	were	not	made	by	virtue	of	the	(ambiguous)	political	standing	
of	European	nobility	in	an	era	of	dramatic	political	transformation	nor	by	the	wealth	
of	that	same	class	(i.e.	Weber’s	“class”	category),	but	rather	by	virtue	of	the	social	
status	that	was	still	reserved	for	this	aristocracy.	That	is,	while	the	wealth	and	
political	access	of	the	titled	individuals	recruited	into	Coubertin’s	Olympic	project	
were	certainly	not	insignificant	to	their	influence,	the	aspects	of	their	authority	that	
led	Coubertin	to	exploit	them	as	a	pan‐European	network	was	that	granted	to	them	
by	“virtue	of	successful	claims	to	higher‐ranking	descent:	hereditary	status	groups”	
(Weber,	1978,	p.	306).	Indeed	Cropper	has	argued	that	the	entire	Olympic	endeavor	
was,	at	least	initially,	an	effort	to	reestablish	the	primacy	of	a	European‐wide	
aristocratic	order,	albeit	an	enlightened	one	intimately	familiar	with	and	
instrumental	in	managing	the	structural	changes	occurring	through	
industrialization,	urbanization,	and	democratization	(Cropper,	2008).	
Ultimately,	it	is	difficult	to	argue	against	Coubertin’s	success	as	the	prophet	
of	what	he	called	a	secular	religion.2	Certainly,	he	perceived	his	own	decades‐long	
efforts	as	having	largely	succeeded	in	firmly	establishing	and	globalizing	the	
Olympic	movement:	
When	I	planned	to	re‐established	the	Olympic	Games,	
people	took	me	for	a	madman….	Yet	the	Games	were	re‐
established,	and	the	principle	of	the	Games	has	now	
been	accepted	by	all	nations.	The	rhythm	of	the	
Olympiads	has	entered	the	fabric	of	international	life,	
and	is	now	a	regular	factor	in	that	life….	In	faraway	
countries,	youths	are	training	in	the	muscular	exertions	
that	will	earn	them	the	honor	of	appearing	in	the	
stadium	on	the	walls	of	which,	through	a	recent	decision	
of	the	International	Olympic	Committee,	the	names	of	
the	victors	shall	be	cared	from	now	on.	This	Committee,	
which	I	have	had	the	honor	of	chairing	from	the	start,	
and	on	which	sit	representatives	of	forty‐two	countries	
in	Europe,	America,	Asia	and	Africa	is,	as	was	said	last	
year	on	the	rostrum	in	Geneva,	a	miniature	League	of	
nations.	Through	over	twenty‐seven	years	of	operation,	
it	has	faced	many	conflicts	but	it	has	never	failed	in	its	
																																																								
2	“The	primary,	fundamental	characteristic	of	ancient	Olympism,	and	of	modern	Olympism	as	well,	is	
that	it	is	a	religion.	By	chiseling	his	body	through	exercise	as	a	sculptor	does	a	statue,	the	ancient	
athlete	‘honored	the	gods’.	In	doing	likewise,	the	modern	athlete	honors	his	country,	his	race,	and	his	
flag.	Therefore,	I	believe	that	I	was	right	to	restore,	from	the	very	beginning	of	modern	Olympism,	a	
religious	sentiment	transformed	and	expanded	by	the	internationalism	and	democracy	that	are	
distinguishing	features	of	our	day”	(Coubertin,	2000,	p.	580).	
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task.	It	has	moved	on	at	a	steady	pace,	along	a	path	of	
progressive	internationalism.	(Coubertin,	2000,	p.	209)	
And	Coubertin’s	own	assessment	has	not	been	out	of	step	with	other	internal	and	
external	commentators.	Millions	of	individuals	who	have	worked	within	the	global	
Olympic	movement,	have	competed	at	the	Games	and	other	IOC‐sanctioned	events,	
or	have	been	spectators	at,	hosts	of,	or	journalists	covering	the	same	would	not	deny	
the	integral	role	of	Coubertin’s	Olympic	project	in	world	society	and	communities	
and	institutions	around	the	globe.	Students	of	history	and	world	culture	have	
likewise	acknowledged	the	outsized	role	of	the	Olympic	movement	and	Coubertin’s	
singular	role	in	its	establishment:	
Though	satisfied	that	his	brain‐child	had	come	to	life,	
even	Baron	Pierre	de	Coubertin,	the	moving	force	
behind	the	‘restoration’	of	the	Olympic	Games,	appears	
to	have	felt	some	disappointment	[in	the	first	editions	of	
the	Games]….	And	yet,	from	these	inauspicious	
beginnings,	the	Olympics	grew	to	become	a	grand	
spectacle,	the	largest	regularly	staged	event	in	the	
world….	Claiming	the	attention	of	a	global	audience,	the	
Games	have	helped	to	foster	a	shared	awareness	of	
living	in	one	world	society.	(Lechner	and	Boli,	2005,	p.	
1;	see	also	MacAloon,	1981	and	Young,	1996.)3	
By	the	end	of	his	life,	the	charismatic	energies	and	qualities	of	Coubertin	had	
established	a	global	movement	with	thousands	of	disciples,	committees	in	most	
countries	of	the	world,	and	a	wildly	popular	global	festival	with	rituals,	flags,	oaths,	
hymns,	and	all	other	trappings	of	a	vibrant	social	movement.		In	fact,	the	final	Games	
before	his	death,	the	1936	Berlin	Games,	have	been	perceived	as	the	first	broadly	
tele‐visualized	and	globally	media‐saturated	Games	of	the	20th	century.	Hitler	and	
the	Third	Reich	so	enthusiastically	embraced	the	movement	(for	their	own	ends,	of	
course,	as	it	is	for	all	other	editions)	that	his	regime	campaigned	vigorously	for	
Coubertin	to	receive	the	Nobel	Peace	Prize.	
In	sum,	Coubertin’s	charismatic	authority	in	the	revival	of	the	Games	remains	
a	potent	force	today	as	the	IOC	pursues	its	aims	and	enjoys	unparalleled	political	
legitimacy.	His	legacy	is	a	constant	point	of	reference	at	conferences	and	meetings	of	
Olympic	bodies,	in	correspondence	with	world	leaders,	in	speeches	to	global	
audiences	during	the	Olympic	Games,	and	in	many	other	instances.	Dozens	of	
streets,	schools,	stadia,	and	other	infrastructure	around	the	world	are	named	for	the	
Frenchman.	The	Pierre	de	Coubertin	Committee	honors	his	legacy	and	countless	
volumes	have	been	written	recounting	his	efforts	to	found	the	movement.	In	this	
																																																								
3	“The	Olympic	Movement	was	one	of	the	most	significant	‘invented	traditions’	
(Hobsbawm,	1992)	of	the	late	nineteenth	and	twentieth	centuries,	and	it	remains	
the	preeminent	international	cultural	movement	in	global	society	as	we	enter	the	
twenty‐first	century”	(Roche,	2002,	165).	
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sense,	Coubterin	laid	the	foundation	for	subsequent	authoritative	presidents	of	the	
IOC.	
Brundage	
	 Coubertin’s	abilities	to	attract	and	inspire	largely	overshadowed	the	
successive	presidents	who,	although	fulfilling	the	office	of	IOC	president,	frequently	
appealed	to	Coubertin	himself	and,	after	his	death,	his	words	and	his	legacy.	
Coubertin	retired	the	presidency	in	1925	but	his	successor,	the	Count	Henri	Baillet‐
Latour,	was	often	eclipsed	by	the	Baron	until	his	death	in	1937.	Although	respect	
was	paid	to	Baillet‐Latour	as	the	holder	of	the	presidential	office,	Games	organizers,	
IOC	members,	and	the	public	continued	to	look	to	Coubertin	as	possessing	much	
control	and	influence	over	the	movement.	Although	unable	to	attend	the	1936	
Games,	for	example,	Coubertin’s	speech	was	broadcast	over	the	loudspeaker	and	
was	the	genuine	keynote	event	of	the	opening	ceremony.	
	 Upon	Baillet‐Latour’s	death	in	1942,	the	world	was	embroiled	in	a	second	
world	war	and	the	1940	and	1944	Games	had	already	been	cancelled.	The	Swedish	
sports	administrator	Sigfrid	Edstrom	was	a	caretaker	president	until	the	IOC	could	
reconvene	after	the	war	and	he	was	elected	to	serve	as	outright	president	until	
1952.	By	this	time,	the	world	had	dramatically	changed	from	the	one	the	IOC	had	
known	in	1936.	The	1948	London	Games	had	reinitiated	the	cycle	of	Olympic	
competition,	albeit	by	exclusion	of	the	Germans	and	the	Japanese,	and	the	map	of	
Europe	and	indeed	the	world	was	still	in	dramatic	flux.	New	countries	and	new	
borders	had	followed	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	World	War	Two,	and	other	
changes	were	to	continue	over	the	next	several	decades,	with	Cold	War	alliances	
hardening	and	shifting,	and	the	beginnings	of	the	decolonization	of	Africa,	Asia,	and	
parts	of	Latin	America.	
It	was	within	the	context	of	these	transformations	that	the	American	
industrialist	Avery	Brundage	took	over	the	presidency	of	the	IOC	for	two	decades	
(1952‐1972).	Brundage	had	competed	as	a	track	athlete	in	the	1912	Stockholm	
Games	and	thereafter	rose	rapidly	through	the	American	amateur	sporting	
institutions	to	become	one	of	the	most	prominent	Olympic	administrators.	He	was	
vigorous	in	defending	the	IOC	and	the	1936	Berlin	Games	against	threatened	
boycotts	relating	to	the	Third	Reich’s	anti‐Semitic	policies.	He	was	thus	intimately	
involved	with	what	might	be	considered	the	first	generation	of	Olympic	
administrators	and	was	wholeheartedly	invested	in	Coubertin’s	philosophy	of	
Olympism,	amateurism,	and	independence	from	external	political	pressure.	Though	
his	personality	was	not	as	amiable	as	Coubertin’s,	his	dogged,	outspoken,	and	
persuasive	leadership	of	the	movement	bore	a	resemblance	to	the	reviver	of	the	
Games	and	certainly	surpassed	that	of	the	intervening	presidents	(Guttmann	1984).	
Brundage’s	own	brand	of	charismatic	authority	was	likely	necessary	to	the	survival,	
or	at	least	the	continued	relevance,	of	the	Olympic	movement	(as	it	was	then	
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constituted).4	The	routinized	charisma	with	which	the	office	of	IOC	president	had	
been	imbued	by	his	predecessors,	who	borrowed	significantly	from	Coubertin’s	
legacy	in	order	to	govern	the	movement,	was	greatly	expanded	upon	and	reinvented	
by	Brundage.	Although	he	paid	due	(and	sincere)	tribute	to	Coubertin,	the	force	of	
his	own	charisma	and	energy	was	instrumental	in	fending	off	genuine	threats	to	the	
movement	(or	at	least	the	IOC’s	control	of	it)	including	the	outright	takeover	of	the	
Games	by	individual	governments,	United	Nations	institutions,	and	other	actions	
which	Brundage	perceived	as	impositions	upon	the	IOC’s	independence.		
During	Brundage’s	presidency,	for	example,	the	constitution	of	the	IOC	still	
had	a	large	proportion	of	lords,	knights,	and	barons;	but	added	to	these	figures	was	
a	host	of	new	members	who,	despite	the	fact	that	governments	were	not	supposed	
to	be	‘appointing’	national	representatives,	clearly	functioned	as	political	delegates	
(this	was	especially	true	in	the	case	of	new	members	from	state	communist	and	
Third	World	countries).	As	a	result,	despite	the	fact	that	such	state	appointees	were	
often	utilized	to	pursue	national	interests	that	were	at	variance	with	Brundage’s	
own	views,	the	political	influence	of	the	IOC	had	grown	to	the	point	that	Brundage	
boasted	“No	Monarch	ever	held	sway	over	such	a	vast	expanse	of	territory”	(Olympic	
Review	1960,	60).	
Indeed	there	is	probably	no	IOC	president	who	took	greater	pains	to	fend	off	
external	political	influence	than	Avery	Brundage.	Although	he	was	not	always	
successful,	and	although	the	morality	of	the	battles	he	chose	to	fight	can	be	
questioned,	Brundage’s	strong	personality	and	his	ability	to	persuade	and	attract	
consent	(if	not	outright	discipleship)	cannot	be	denied.	Like	Coubertin	in	his	later	
years,	Brundage’s	opposition	to	l’ingerence	politique	was	stubborn.	It	was	also	
likewise	oblivious	(whether	disingenuously	or	otherwise)	to	the	duplicity	of	
Olympic	politics.	The	most	visible	demonstrations	of	political	action	on	the	part	of	
the	IOC	are	often	exposed	when	outside	actors	exert	political	pressure	on	the	latter,	
thus	revealing	the	political	nature	of	sustaining	the	status	quo.	Brundage,	for	
example,	was	elected	to	the	IOC	in	large	part	because	of	his	vehement	objection	as	
the	president	of	the	American	Athletic	Union	to	the	growing	chorus	of	voices	
suggesting	the	United	States	boycott	the	1936	Berlin	Games	because	of	the	Nazi	
regime’s	policies	and	preparations.	For	Brundage,	boycotting	the	Third	Reich	was	
‘political’	but	the	hypocrisy	of	celebrating	the	enlightened	peace‐through‐sport	
ideology	under	the	banners	and	grandiosity	of	a	bigoted	and	murderous	regime	was	
not.	In	his	most	(in)famous	Olympic	moment,	Brundage	delivered	a	speech	the	day	
after	the	Israeli	team	was	murdered	by	Palestinian	terrorists	at	the	1972	Munich	
Games	in	which	he	condemned	political	intrusions	into	the	sacred	Olympic	space	
and	used	the	occasion	to	announce	that	“The	Games…	have	been	subject	to	2	savage	
attacks.	We	lost	the	Rhodesian	battle	against	naked	political	blackmail”	(Guttmann	
1984,	254).	This	second	‘attack’	was	the	insistence	of	African	National	Olympic	
Committees	that	the	racial	regime	(and	Olympic	team)	in	Rhodesia	was	grounds	for	
																																																								
4 This is not to say that Brundage’s particular decisions or personality were necessary, only that the 
institution of the IOC needed this kind of charismatic leadership in order to continue to enjoy the place in 
world society that it had hitherto. 
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its	expulsion	from	the	Games.	Again,	by	bringing	a	political	fight	to	the	IOC,	the	
Africans	had	exposed	the	IOC’s	own	political	choice	to	maintain	the	status	quo.	
Brundage’s	insistence	that	“the	Games	must	go	on”	despite	the	massacre	was	
likewise	a	political	statement.		
	 Brundage	also	exerted	charismatic	authority	to	maintain	the	amateur	nature	
of	the	Games	and	the	movement.	Both	the	commercialization	of	the	Olympic	
movement	in	general	and	the	introduction	of	professionals	into	the	Games	in	
particular	were	completely	rejected	by	Brundage.	Indeed	Brundage	may	have	been	
even	more	polemical	towards	the	role	of	money	in	Olympic	sport	than	his	
predecessors	and	successors	because	of	his	childhood	experiences	with	organized	
crime	and	corrupted	professional	sports	in	his	hometown	of	Chicago.	For	him,	
amateur	sport	was	the	antidote	to	“the	gross	social	and	economic	injustices	in	the	
imperfect	world	in	which	we	live”	(Guttmann	1984,	11).	Like	Coubertin,	Brundage	
viewed	the	Olympic	movement	as	the	(literal)	level	playing	field	upon	which	all	
amateur	athletes	could	enjoy	equal	chances	for	success.	The	introduction	of	money	–	
whether	through	sponsorship	of	the	Games,	subsidizing	the	IOC,	or	sponsorship,	
salaries,	broken‐time	payments	or	any	other	compensation	for	athletes	and	teams	–	
would	distort	this	playing	field	and,	like	the	injection	of	partisan	politics,	destroy	the	
spirit	of	Olympism.	
	 Of	course,	not	all	expressions	of	charismatic	leadership	are	created	equal.	
While	Brundage	ensured	that	his	tenure	would	be	marked	by	the	continued	
privilege	and	legitimacy	of	the	Olympic	movement	in	world	affairs,	and	not	by	
external	usurpations	of	IOC	control,	the	dilution	of	amateurism,	or	the	corrupting	
influence	of	corporate	sponsorships,	internally	his	strong	and	reinvigorating	role	
had	perhaps	been	excessively	severe	and	alienating.	Rather	than	replacing	
Brundage	with	the	charismatic	Comte	de	Beaumont,	the	IOC	members	voted	in	the	
rather	jovial	Lord	Killanin.	This	clearly	irked	Brundage,	who	believed	that	if	the	IOC	
was	to	survive,	it	needed	“a	leader.	And	[Killanin]	isn’t	a	leader”	(Guttmann,	1984,	
p.247).5	In	response	to	this	election,	but	also	in	recognition	of	the	immense	(and	
losing)	battle	Brundage	believed	he	had	fought,	he	predicted,	upon	handing	over	the	
symbolic	keys	of	the	IOC	to	Killanin,	that	“you	won’t	have	much	use	for	these;	I	
believe	the	Olympic	Movement	will	not	last	more	than	another	few	years”	(Payne,	
2006,	p.	5‐6).	
Samaranch	
The	eight	years	of	Killanin’s	presidential	term	returned	the	leadership	of	the	
IOC	to	the	routinized	charisma	that	accompanied	the	office	by	virtue	of	the	outsized	
personality	of	Coubertin	and,	perhaps	without	acknowledgement,	Brundage.	Indeed	
by	the	end	of	the	1970s,	many	commentators	believed	that	Brundage’s	pessimism	
regarding	the	Olympic	movement	had	nearly	been	realized.	After	the	1972	massacre	
of	the	Israeli	team	at	the	Munich	Games,	dozens	of	African	countries	had	boycotted	
																																																								
5 For his part, Killanin seemed to run (successfully) on a platform that he was “not Avery Brundage” 
(Guttmann, 1984, 247). 
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the	1976	Montreal	Games	to	protest	the	participation	of	other	countries	who	had	
violated	rules	and	practices	against	staging	matches	with	the	apartheid	South	
African	sport	system.	As	well,	both	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	(Beijing)	and	the	
Republic	of	China	(Taipei,	Taiwan)	had	boycotted	Montreal	at	the	last	minute	
because	the	Canadian	government	had	refused	to	allow	the	latter	to	compete	as	the	
Republic	of	China	but	had	compromised	to	let	them	compete	as	Taiwan,	to	Beijing’s	
consternation.	In	early	1980,	the	United	States	and	dozens	of	allies	committed	to	
boycott	the	Moscow	Games.	The	IOC	was	nearly	bankrupt	and,	after	the	Montreal	
Games	left	the	host	saddled	with	decades	of	public	debt,	only	Los	Angeles	lined	up	to	
host	the	1984	Games.	
Enter	Juan	Antonio	Samaranch.	After	his	1980	election	to	the	presidency,	
Samaranch	recounted:	“I	felt	so	alone	that	I	couldn’t	cope	with	all	the	demands	of	
the	job,	with	the	sizeable	problems	that	I	knew	there	were	and	had	to	be	handled.	It	
was	a	feeling	that	lasted	maybe	two	weeks,	during	which	it	even	crossed	my	mind	
how	I	might	withdraw”	(quoted	in	Payne	2006,	11).	Samaranch	had	long	been	
involved	in	the	Olympic	movement	and	in	sports	administration.	He	was	a	minister	
in	General	Franco’s	dictatorial	government	and	was	thereafter	Spain’s	ambassador	
to	the	Soviet	Union.	Indeed	he	likely	commanded	even	higher	influence	within	the	
corridors	of	political	power	than	Coubertin	or	any	other	Olympic	leader.	He	
demanded	to	be	called	“Excellency”	(a	title	otherwise	reserved	for	heads	of	state)	
and	he	brought	an	end	to	the	cycle	of	East‐West	boycotts	of	the	Games.	He	also	
contravened	a	United	Nations	Security	Council	resolution	banning	Yugoslavian	
athletes	from	international	competition	in	the	course	of	hostilities	and	used	the	UN’s	
own	force	in	the	region	to	whisk	these	same	athletes	out	of	besieged	Sarajevo	
directly	to	the	1992	Barcelona	Games	(bypassing	the	normal	Spanish	entry	
procedures	for	foreigners,	especially	from	war‐torn	countries).	In	short,	the	
diminutive	Spaniard	was	the	most	charismatic	and	audacious	president	since	
Coubertin	himself.	
However,	as	we	have	seen,	this	level	of	influence	among	formal	political	
institutions	is	not	wholly	without	precedent.	Rather,	what	set	the	“Samaranch	
revolution”	apart	from	previous	leaders’	endeavors	was	the	path	upon	which	he	set	
the	entire	Olympic	movement	that	(for	the	foreseeable	future)	will	likely	preclude	
the	necessity	(though	perhaps	not	the	actual	realization)	of	maintaining	the	level	of	
charismatic	authority	that	only	individual	presidents	can	bring.	In	parting	with	the	
nearly	century‐long	traditions	of	amateurism	and	non‐commercialism,	Samaranch	
fully	embraced	the	logic	of	the	market	in	terms	of	both	the	individual	athletes	and	
the	“Olympic	brand”	as	a	whole.6		Nothing	exemplifies	this	fundamental	redirection	
of	the	Olympic	movement	more	than	the	wholesale	cooptation	of	celebrities	and	
																																																								
6 The commercialization of the Olympic brand has been extensively treated elsewhere and we do not wish 
to repeat that literature here, except insofar as to recognize the Olympic turn towards global capital flows 
and the pairing of odd bedfellows in the form of sponsorships (see Payne 2006; Barney et al, 2002). The 
acceptance of professionals into the Olympic fold has likewise been extensively treated, and we only 
address it here as it applies to the appropriation of the influence of professional‐athletes‐as‐celebrities 
(see Allison 2001, Slack 2004). 
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popular	culture,	and,	in	this	sense,	Samaranch	became	the	most	assuredly	
‘celebritized’	president	IOC	president.	
This	change	in	the	culture	and	ideals	of	the	Olympic	movement	began	almost	
immediately	upon	Samaranch’s	taking	office.	In	1981	at	the	Olympic	Congress	in	
Baden‐Baden,	Germany,	the	IOC	began	to	fundamentally	alter	the	way	it	financed	
Olympic	activities.	The	“Olympic	brand”	is	now	touted	as	the	world’s	most	
recognizable	brand,	and	many	of	the	world’s	other	contenders	for	that	title	are	
actually	sponsors	of	the	movement	(i.e.	McDonald’s,	Coca‐Cola,	Visa,	etc;	see	Wall,	
2001.).	The	literature	on	the	IOC’s	transformation	from	a	lean	organization	run	
largely	by	infrequent	meetings	and	mail‐in	votes	to	an	extremely	well‐financed	and	
professionalized	bureaucratic	institution	of	global	significance	is	extensive	and	need	
not	be	belabored	here.	What	is	important	is	to	understand	that	this	newfound	
wealth	(and	in	particular	the	new	exposure	to	media	outlets	that	were	lining	up	to	
bid	for	the	right	to	broadcast	the	Games)	began	a	larger	trend	towards	the	
appropriation	of	a	heavily	celebritized	culture	that	has	since	been	incorporated	into	
every	element	of	the	movement.	
The	vertical	integration	of	celebrity	culture	into	the	IOC	was	not	as	deliberate	
or	as	rapid	as	the	decision	to	commercialize	the	Olympic	movement	through	
corporate	sponsorships	at	the	global	and	national	levels.	In	some	ways,	it	may	have	
gone	unnoticed	as	the	natural	outgrowth	of	the	process	of	commercialization.	
Nevertheless,	the	instrumental	use	of	celebrities	and	celebritized	culture	marked	a	
distinct	departure	for	the	IOC.	It	is	not	that	the	worlds	of	Olympic	sport	and	
celebrity	had	not	crossed	paths	before.7	In	the	past	30	years,	however,	the	IOC	has	
not	only	invited	and	co‐opted	professional	athlete‐celebrities,	but	has	also	
incorporated	celebrities	with	little	or	no	connection	to	the	Games	or	even	sports	
more	generally.	This	appropriation	of	celebrity	power	has	generated	unprecedented	
revenue,	unprecedented	visibility,	and	a	sense	of	the	fitness	and	universality	of	the	
IOC’s	place	in	world	society.	
Consider	two	illustrations	of	the	instrumentalization	of	celebrity	power	
under	the	Samaranch	tenure.	Most	naturally,	but	perhaps	most	profoundly,	the	
admission	of	professionals	into	the	ranks	of	Olympians,	a	process	that	Samaranch	
was	directly	involved	in	promoting	and	negotiating,	made	way	for	the	
celebritization	of	Olympic	influence.	The	professionalization	of	the	Games	was	
somewhat	gradual,	but	the	most	popular,	mediatized	image	representing	this	
process	is	that	of	the	“Dream	Team”	composed	of	professional	American	basketball	
players	competing	at	the	1992	Barcelona	Games.	Far	more	than	merely	dwarfing	all	
other	teams	and	winning	the	gold	medal,	the	Dream	Team	was	a	celebritized	
phenomenon	unlike	anything	the	Olympics	had	previously	experienced.	The	hotels,	
the	Olympic	village,	the	Games’	venues,	the	airports,	and	everywhere	else	the	
superstars	from	the	National	Basketball	Association	went,	they	were	literally	
mobbed	by	fans	(including	many	opposing	players)	for	autographs	and	other	
																																																								
7 Think,	for	example,	of	Johnny	Weismuller,	the	five‐time	Olympic	gold	medalist	that	became	the	
famous	ululating	Tarzan	in	many	films	in	the	1930s. 
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personal	exchanges.	The	members	of	the	Dream	Team	were	celebrities	unlike	
anything	the	Olympic	movement	had	seen	before,	with	one	executive	from	the	
Burns	Celebrity	Services	firm	commenting,	“No	doubt	about	it,	this	is	the	biggest,	
most	expensive	marketing	deal	in	the	history	of	sports”	(Cunningham	2009,	450).	
The	admission	of	professionals	was	more	than	merely	an	attempt	to	secure	
the	best	athletes	in	the	world;	it	was	the	means	by	which	the	IOC	most	legitimately	
capitalized	upon	the	celebrity	power	of	sports	stars	whose	social	status	had	long	
since	surpassed	their	seemingly	superhuman	physical	feats.	Students	of	sports	
history	will	be	able	to	note	what	a	sea	change	this	professionalization	process	
represented.	The	devotion	to	amateurism	as	the	defining	and	glorifying	feature	of	
the	Olympic	movement	had	been	fanatical.	The	image	of	the	professional	as	nothing	
more	than	a	trained	animal	or	as	one	who	prostituted	him	or	herself	had	often	been	
invoked.	And,	for	many,	the	1992	Dream	Team	confirmed	those	features	of	
professional	sports	which	IOC	members	had	most	feared:	the	team	stayed	in	lavish	
hotels,	behaved	as	entitled	superiors	rather	than	internationalist	ambassadors,	and,	
worst	of	all,	nearly	failed	to	take	to	the	winner’s	podium	when	their	most	important	
loyalties	(i.e.	to	their	corporate	sponsors)	were	in	jeopardy	because	of	conflicting	
sponsorship	obligations	between	the	United	States	Olympic	Committee	and	the	
individual	players.	
Yet	there	was	no	doubting	that	great	economic	and	political	power	was	to	be	
had	for	Samaranch	and	the	Olympics	by	capitalizing	upon	the	celebrity	of	the	Dream	
Team.	The	media	coverage	of	the	team	and	the	basketball	tournament	was	extensive	
and	lucrative.	Indeed,	so	outsized	was	the	role	of	these	NBA	celebrities	that	one	
USOC	official	remarked	that	“There	are	young	people	out	there	who	think	the	
Olympics	are	one	big	basketball	tournament”	(Cunningham	2009,	87).	In	terms	of	
Samaranch’s	authoritative	efforts	to	revive	the	Games,	and	to	convince	political	and	
financial	institutions	of	the	continuing	relevance	of	the	movement,	nothing,	it	seems,	
could	have	been	more	welcome.	Not	surprisingly,	then,	Samaranch	was	directly	
involved	years	later	with	the	introduction	of	National	Hockey	League	players	into	
the	Winter	Games.		
Still,	perhaps	the	most	powerful	implementation	of	celebrity	power	arising	
from	the	Samaranch	presidency	was	the	“Celebrate	Humanity”	advertising	
campaign.	The	campaign	began	in	2000	while	the	IOC	was	in	the	midst	of	the	
corruption	scandals	that	plagued	Samaranch’s	last	years	as	head.	In	many	ways,	it	
represented	the	culmination	of	his	efforts	to	transform	the	IOC	into	one	of	the	most	
visible	and	powerful	non‐governmental	organizations	on	earth.	The	entire	campaign	
was	overseen	by	Michael	Payne,	who	began	working	for	the	IOC	at	the	same	time	
that	Samaranch	took	office	in	the	early	1980s	and	became	the	organization’s	
marketing	director	under	Samaranch	in	1998.		
Celebrate	Humanity	made	extensive	use	of	celebrities	who	were	neither	
Olympians	nor	even	well‐known	athletes.	The	first	celebrity	courted	for	the	
campaign	was	Robin	Williams,	the	renowned	American	actor	who	had	never	
previously	done	the	kind	of	voiceover	work	that	he	did	for	the	IOC.	After	Williams,	a	
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cavalcade	of	celebrities	was	enlisted	to	record	talking‐heads	or	voiceovers	for	the	
video	clips	that	were	run	thousands	of	times	around	the	world:	Avril	Lavigne,	
Nelson	Mandela,	Kofi	Annan,	Christopher	Reeve	and	Andrea	Bocelli.	In	addition,	as	
Maguire	et	al.	(2008)	have	pointed	out,	these	global	celebrities	were	complimented	
by	a	host	of	locally‐recognized	celebrities	for	local	markets;	the	marketing	team	
responsible	for	the	campaign	had	intentionally	generated	media	that	could	be	
adapted	to	local	languages	and	celebrity	personalities.	The	celebrities	used	included	
Siti	Nurhaliza	(Malaysia),	Omar	Sharif	(Morocco,	Algeria,	and	France)	Valeri	Gergiev	
(Russia),	Steffi	Graf	(Germany),	Giovane	Gavio	(Brazil),	Youngpil	Cho	(South	Korea),	
and	Maura	Tierney	(United	States)	(International	Olympic	Committee,	Athens	2004	
Report,	105).	Thus,	the	campaign	was	not	a	blunt	instrument,	but	one	tailored	to	
engage	and	energize	the	greatest	number	of	people	worldwide	(Maguire	et	al.	
2008).8	
The	IOC	also	explicitly	noted	that	Canadian	musician	Avril	Lavigne	“was	
specially	chosen	for	her	ability	to	appeal	to	the	youth	of	the	world”	(International	
Olympic	Committee	2004).	Compared	to	other	included	celebrities	(like	Nelson	
Mandela,	who	was	a	boxer	in	his	youth,	was	a	privileged	guest	at	the	IOC	
headquarters	in	Switzerland,	and	made	a	personal	appeal	for	Cape	Town’s	bid	to	
host	the	2004	Games),	Lavigne	did	not	easily	call	to	mind	specific	Olympic	
connections	or	credentials.	Instead,	the	audience	for	the	campaign	was	simply	told	
why	she	thought	that	“the	Olympic	Games	rock”	(International	Olympic	Committee,	
Athens	2004	Report,	105).	This	particular	contribution	seems	to	be	the	clearest	
example	of	the	Olympic’s	instrumentalization	of	celebrity	power,	begun	under	
Samaranch.	The	subject,	Lavigne,	had	no	readily	accessible	connection	to	the	
movement;	instead,	she	was	selected	(to	sell	a	product,	as	Maguire	et	al.,	2008,	
elaborate)	because	of	her	“appeal”	among	young	consumers.	Following	Marks	and	
Fisher	(2002),	given	that	these	young	audiences	were	not	necessarily	interested	in,	
or	attuned	to,	the	social	importance	and	political	legitimacy	of	the	Olympics	and	IOC,	
celebrities	like	Lavigne	were	useful	to	the	extent	that	they	could	serve	as	arbiters	of	
the	organization’s	cultural	and	political	authority.			
Rogge	and	Beyond	
	 Following	the	notion	of	routinized	charisma,	Samaranch’s	revolution	seems	
to	have	ushered	the	IOC	and	the	broader	movement	into	an	era	where	individual	
charisma	is	less	deterministic.	That	is,	although	the	IOC	has	always	dined	(literally	
and	figuratively)	at	the	table	of	kings	and	presidents	and	has	enjoyed	(varying)	
levels	of	privilege	and	legitimacy	seemingly	beyond	its	stature,	the	wholesale	
subjection	of	the	organization	and	the	Olympic	ideals	to	the	logic	of	a	global	market	
																																																								
8 Even the choice of celebrities was illustrative of the use of celebrity power by the IOC. The inclusion of 
Nelson Mandela, for example, yielded a number of influential images to the Olympic movement. Mandela 
was, of course, a political leader and the head of the South African state. He also conjured remembrance 
of the IOC’s (somewhat belated) boycott of apartheid‐era South Africa. Further, as attested to in the 
recent findings of the Reputation Institute, Mandela is perhaps the most visible and admired “public 
personality” in the world (Reputation Institute 2011). 
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(and	particularly	the	marketplace’s	global	celebrities)	has	insulated	it	against	
depending	on	the	goodwill	of	any	given	prime	minister,	philanthropist,	or	
ambassador	and	imbued	the	Olympic	Movement,	and	the	position	of	IOC	president,	
with	ongoing	authority.	Samaranch’s	successor,	Jacques	Rogge,	is	decidedly	less	
charismatic	than	the	three	presidents	examined	here,	and,	as	an	orthopedic	surgeon,	
has	less	access	to	formal	political	networks.	Yet	his	tenure,	beginning	in	2001,	has,	
despite	serious	criticisms,	never	seemed	to	have	placed	the	long‐term	viability	of	
the	IOC	in	jeopardy	(see,	for	example,	Worden,	2011,	62‐71).	Even	in	the	face	of	the	
global	economic	crisis,	urban	centers	around	the	world	continue	to	line	up	in	
Lausanne	to	compete	to	host	the	Games,	the	coffers	of	the	IOC	are	at	unprecedented	
levels	and	the	Olympic	rings,	as	a	symbol,	remain	universally	recognizable	(Wall	
2001).	The	IOC’s	contemporary	embracing	of	celebrity	culture,	whether	through	
celebrity	athletes	or	otherwise	unaffiliated	celebrities,	means	that	corporations	and	
other	profit‐making	firms	now	have	every	interest	in	making	the	Games	the	most	
visible,	successful,	and	commercialized	spectacle	possible.	Thus,	even	though	Rogge	
and	his	successors	may	not	possess	the	charisma	typically	necessary	for	celebrity	
politicians,	the	celebritization	of	the	IOC	as	an	institution,	and	the	office	of	the	
presidency	in	particular,	seems	firm.	
Conclusion:	
In	this	paper,	we	have	attempted	to	illustrate	the	forms	of	power	enjoyed	by	
IOC	presidents	Coubertin,	Brundage,	and	Samaranch	that	afforded	each	of	them	a	
measure	of	political	celebrity.	At	the	same	time,	we	have	suggested	that	capitalizing	
on,	and	eventually	co‐opting,	celebrity	culture	afforded	the	IOC	a	new,	and	perhaps	
dubious,	form	of	power	and	influence	under	Samaranch	that	was	absent	during	the	
presidencies	of	Coubertin	and	Brundage.	Indeed,	with	the	political	avenues	for	
power	relatively	unchanged	over	the	years,	the	commercialization	and	the	
celebritization	of	the	Olympic	Movement	beginning	with	Samaranch	represents	a	
dramatic	yet	practical	response	to	shifting	norms	in	world	society	and	the	trajectory	
of	global	capitalism.	That	is,	although	the	IOC	now	enjoys	a	level	of	class	power	
without	precedent	in	its	history,	the	status‐based	influence	it	wields	through	the	
cooptation	of	celebrity	power	is	a	separate,	but	equally	significant	source	of	power.	
Similarly,	while	the	logic	of	commercializing	the	Olympic	brand	also	made	its	
celebritization	possible,	the	ability	to	attract,	persuade,	hire,	and	enjoy	the	company	
of	celebrities	has	multiplied	the	normative	power	of	the	IOC	and	improved	the	
political	clout	and	status	it	enjoys	on	a	global	scale.	
Of	course,	the	means	by	which	the	three	IOC	presidents	under	review	
accumulated	and	exercised	power	in	world	society	differed	in	accordance	with	the	
prevailing	environmental	norms	of	their	respective	eras.	Thus,	while	continuities	
can	certainly	be	uncovered	across	the	entire	modern	Olympic	period,	the	political	
reach	and	effectiveness	of	Coubertin,	Brundage,	and	Samaranch	depended	to	a	large	
extent	upon	their	abilities	not	only	to	navigate	these	evolving	world	cultural	norms	
but	to	appropriate	them	and	command	respect	and	deference	(i.e.	power)	for	the	
IOC	as	an	institution.	
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In	conclusion,	it	is	possible	to	connect	the	narrative	that	we	have	offered	here	
to	the	process	of	political	re‐invigoration	in	the	face	of	apathy	as	described	by	Marks	
and	Fisher	(2002).	Clearly,	IOC	presidents	have	had	regular	recourse	to	political	
celebrity	and,	more	recently,	to	the	political	use	of	celebrity	culture	more	broadly	
and	have	leveraged	these	opportunities	to	re‐position,	reinvigorate,	and	energize	
public	understandings	of	the	legitimacy	of	the	Olympic	Games	and	Olympic	
movement,	particularly	in	times	of	crisis.	As	we	have	been	careful	to	illustrate,	this	
does	not	necessarily	mean	that	Coubertin,	Brundage	and	Samaranch	should	be	
considered	celebrities	in	their	own	right,	but	does	suggest	that	their	sources	of	
power,	understood	here	in	Weberian	terms,	and	the	rise	in	celebrity	culture	more	
broadly	in	the	past	three	decades,	have	afforded	them	a	type	of	political	celebrity	
that	is	not	insignificant.	Particularly	as	the	Olympics	under	Jacques	Rogge	move	
towards	an	ever	more	ambitious	global	standing	–	illustrated	by	recently	formalized	
partnership	with	the	United	Nations	and	the	IOC’s	championing	of	international	
development	through	sport	–	close	attention	should	be	paid	to	the	ways	in	which	
party,	class	and	status	continue	to	contribute	to	the	political	legitimacy	of	the	IOC	
and	its	leaders,	including	President	Rogge.	The	ever	increasing	connections	between	
the	Olympic	Games	and	the	culture	of	celebrity,	and	the	political	implications	
thereof,	are	worthy	of	ongoing	analysis.					
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